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Brief Facts
In early 2003, web sites operated by
Digilandmall advertised colour laser printers at a
price of US$45, which normally sold for around
US$2,000. This arose because a set of figures,
which were used in a training session, were
inadvertently uploaded on the relevant web sites. It
did not take long for internet web sites to spread
the news of the fantastic colour laser printer
prices. Over the course of the next few days, until
the error was discovered, 784 individuals placed
1,008 purchase orders for over 4,086 laser
printers. Of these, six individuals placed 18 orders
for a total of 1,606 laser printers. If the orders
were completed, these individuals would have
been entitled to US$3.2 million worth of printers
for a little more than US$64,000. Not surprisingly,
Digilandmall chose to not honour the orders.
These six individuals eventually brought the
present action against Digilandmall. In the first
instance, Judicial Commissioner VK Rajah rendered
his judgment in early April 2004. The judge found
for the defendants on the grounds of unilateral
mistake. The plaintiffs appealed the decision to the
Singapore Court of Appeal, which gave its
judgment in January 2005. 
Section 13(8) of the Electronic Transactions Act
which provides “(n)othing in this section shall
affect the law of agency or the law on the
formation of contracts” recognizes that the law of
agency and that pertaining to the formation of
contracts continue to apply to electronic
transactions. As we shall see, these two operated
as opposing poles in the present case.
Behind the Appeal
At the heart of the appeal, the six individuals
disputed that they had the requisite levels of
knowledge. The Court of Appeal rejected that
contention, as the fact of knowledge has to be
discovered from the surrounding circumstances.
The Court of Appeal gave an example of
Nelsonian knowledge or “wilful blindness or
shutting one’s eyes to the obvious”. By this, the
court meant that customers with blinkered
attitudes would not impress the court with their
claims of lack of knowledge. The Court of Appeal
also noted that it was not possible to be
exhaustive, but it was prepared to be sensible in
deciding what circumstances would give rise to
situations in which customers should ask whether
there was indeed a mistake.
Evidence presented at first
instance
As matters of appeal seldom re-open questions
of fact, the evidence presented at the court of first
instance was crucial. Part of the evidence included
internet chat links (likely to be instant messaging
conversations) and e-mails. There was little dispute
whether these chat links and e-mails were
admissible. Section 35 of the Evidence Act clearly
provides for the admissibility of computer output
under various circumstances. For example:
“computer output is tendered in evidence for
any purpose whatsoever, such output shall be
admissible … and it is shown by the party
tendering such output that (i) there is no
reasonable ground for believing that the output
is inaccurate because of improper use of the
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computer and that no reason exists to doubt or
suspect the truth or reliability of the output;
and (ii) there is reasonable ground to believe
that at all material times the computer was
operating properly, or if not, that in any respect
in which it was not operating properly or out
of operation, the accuracy of the output was
not affected by such circumstances.”
Although they did not constitute elements
leading to the formation of the contract,
nevertheless they were elements leading to the
vitiation of the contract.
This evidence revealed that the appellants were
aware of a possible mistake, and some had
conducted price research and legal research in the
middle of the night. The trial judge noted that it
was perhaps a case of “poetic justice” that the
ICQ chat session of the plaintiffs and the
plaintiffs’ exchange of e-mails played a significant
role in undermining their credibility and claims.
With this evidence, the Court of Appeal was
satisfied that all six individuals had the requisite
levels of knowledge to allow Digiland to claim
relief on the basis of unilateral mistake.
Unsuccessful e-contracts
arguments
Of additional interest, the Court of Appeal also
noted that Digiland raised thorough arguments
on the formation of e-contracts that were
eventually unsuccessful. These included an
argument that the use of automated e-mail
software responses meant there was no proper
contract. These arguments essentially run counter
to having a seamless e-commerce operation. In
particular, the High Court affirmed that Section
13 of the Electronic Transactions Act of Singapore
deems that a message by a party’s automated
computer system originates from the party itself.
Section 13(2)(b) provides that “(a)s between the
originator and the addressee, an electronic record
is deemed to be that of the originator if it was
sent by an information system programmed by or
on behalf of the originator to operate
automatically”. 
The fact that the acceptance was automatically
generated by computer software therefore
cannot exonerate Digiland from responsibility. It
was Digiland’s computer system, and Digiland
had programmed the software for the computer
system. This point reinforces the classic discussion
in e-contract law whether a computer has the
requisite ability to form the intention to contract.
Applying the principles of agency, it is clear that a
computer can do so as an agent of the
contracting party. As Digiland failed in this part of
their arguments, the Court of Appeal decided
that they should bear part of the costs.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the courts in Singapore have
once again reaffirmed the sanctity of contracts
formed over the internet and the applicability of
the same rules which apply to off-line contracts
to on-line contracts. In particular, the courts have
not allowed parties who deliberately shut their
eyes to the mistakes of others to benefit. While it
is rare for faceless and impersonal online
contracts to reveal the state of mind of the
parties, this decision reminds us that in spite of
attempts to create immutable contracts, the basic
principles of the law of obligations still continue
to apply.
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